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a b s t r a c t
A nonlinear triopoly game with heterogeneous players is presented. We consider three
types of players; boundedly rational, adaptive, and naive. A triopoly game is modelled by
a three dimensional discrete dynamical system. The stability conditions of the equilibrium
points are analyzed. Numerical simulations are used to show bifurcation diagrams, phase
portraits, sensitive dependence on initial conditions and fractal dimension. The chaotic
behavior of the model has been stabilized on the Nash equilibrium point, by the use of
the Pyragas delay feedback control method.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The oligopolymodel is the casewhere themarket is controlled by a few firms producing the same goods or homogeneous
goods. The classic oligopoly model was proposed in (1838) by the French mathematician, Augustin Cournot [1]. The
dynamical oligopoly game is complex, because the oligopolist must consider not only the behaviors of the consumers, but
also those of the competitors and their reactions. In repeated oligopoly games, all players maximize their profits, while the
triopoly game is a market with three competitors. Recently, the dynamics of the triopoly game have been studied [2–5]. A
triopoly game with homogeneous players has been studied by Puu [2]. He considered that all the players in his game are
naive player, and showed that the dynamics of a triopoly game can lead to complex dynamics such as cycles and chaos. Agiza
et al. [3] extended the Cournot duopoly game to the triopoly case, and studied the multistability of the game. Discrete times
dynamic triopoly games with homogenous expectations have been found to be of economic interest [2–5]. In these studies,
the players were considered to have the same expectations rules for the computed expected outputs. But it is impossible
all players to have the same expectations to estimate their outputs. Three heterogeneous players are proposed: boundedly
rational player, adaptive player and naive player — see Agiza and Elsadany [6,7]. So each player adjusts his output in order
to maximize his profit by using an different strategy. Agiza And Elsadany [6,7] studied the duopoly gamewith heterogenous
players. Zhang et al. [8] have applied the technique of Agiza and Elsadany to study the duopoly game with a nonlinear
cost function. Also Elabbasy et al. [9] have developed the triopoly game with heterogeneous players. Elabbasy et al. studied
the dynamical behaviors of the triopoly game with heterogeneous players with linear cost function [9]. In this paper, we
investigate the dynamical analysis of the case of the triopoly gamewith heterogeneous players with nonlinear cost function.
The paper is organized as follows, the description of the triopoly game with heterogeneous players is described in
Section 2. In Section 3,we shall study the existence and local stability of fixedpoints of the three dimensionalmap.Dynamical
behaviors under some change of control parameters of the game are investigated by numerical simulations in Section 4. Also,
Lyapunov exponents and the fractal dimension of the strange attractor of our map is calculated numerically. Delay feedback
control method is proposed to control chaos of the system in Section 5. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
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2. Triopoly game with Heterogeneous players
In the classical triopoly game, research interest was concentrated on competitions between firms which were
homogeneous, in the sense that theywere taking the same strategy. Tomake the gamemore realistic, we consider amixture
of different strategies in the game.When in the triopoly game, the players can choose simple expectations rules such as naive
or complicated, as adaptive expectations and bounded rationality. The players can use the same strategy (homogeneous
expectations) or can use different strategies (heterogeneous expectations) to decide their outputs in the market. In this
work, we consider three fully heterogeneous players, every player using different strategy for profit maximization. Three
different players’ expectations are proposed; the boundedly rational player, adaptive player and naive player.
We consider a Cournot triopoly game where qi denotes the quantity supplied by firm i, i = 1, 2, 3. In addition, let
p(qi + qj), i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j, denote a twice differentiable and nonincreasing inverse demand function that has the
form
p = f (Q ) = a− bQ , (1)
where Q = q1+q2+q3 the total supply and a, b are positive constants. Let Ci(qi) denote the twice differentiable increasing
cost function. In this work, we have that cost function has the nonlinear form [7]
Ci(qi) = ciq2i . (2)
By using Eqs. (1) and (2) for firm i, the profit resulting is given by
Πi = pqi − Ci(qi) = qi(a− b(Q ))− ciq2i i, j = 1, 2, 3. (3)
We consider a simple Cournot-type triopoly market where players produce homogeneous goods which are perfect
substitutes and over them at discrete-time periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . . on a common market. At each period t , every player
must form an expectation of the rival’s output in the next time period in order to determine the corresponding profit-
maximizing quantities for period t + 1. If we denote by qi(t) the output of player i at time period t , then its production
qi(t + 1), i = 1, 2, 3 for the next time period t + 1 is decided by solving the three optimization problems
qi = ri(qj) = argmax
qi
[qi(a− b(Q ))− ciq2i ], i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j.
This optimization problem has a unique solution, given by
qi = 12(b+ ci)
(
a− b
3∑
j=1,j6=i
qj
)
. (4)
We assume that one player use bounded rationality, hence does not has a complete knowledge of the demand function
of the market, and builds his output decision on the basis of the expected marginal profit ∂Πi
∂qi
[10]. If the marginal profit
is positive (negative) he increases (decreases) its production qi at next period output. We denote the boundedly rational
player by i = 1. Then the dynamical equation of player 1 has the form
q1(t + 1) = q1(t)+ αq1(t) ∂Π1
∂q1(t)
, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . (5)
whereα is a positive parameterwhich represents the relative speed adjustment. By using Eq. (3), then the dynamic equation
of the boundedly rational player is
q1(t + 1) = q1(t)+ αq1(t)(a− 2(b+ c1)q1 − b(q2 + q3)). (6)
We assume player 2 is an adaptive player. When player 2 thinks with adaptive expectation, he computes his outputs
with weights between the last period’s output (q2) and his reaction function (r2(q1, q3)). By using the above assumptions,
and using Eq. (4), the dynamical equation of the adaptive player 2 is given by
q2(t + 1) = (1− ν)q2(t)+ ν2(b+ c2) (a− b(q1 + q3)) (7)
where ν ∈ [0, 1] is the speed of adjustment of the adaptive player.
When the player 3 is a naive player, he computes his outputs using the reaction function in Eq. (2). If we assume that the
optimization problem in Eq. (4) has unique solutions, then the dynamical equation of player 3 has the form
q3(t + 1) = 12(b+ c3) (a− b(q1 + q2)). (8)
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Then the dynamical triopoly game in this case is formed from combining Eqs. (6)–(8). Then the dynamical triopoly game
with heterogeneous players when the cost function is nonlinear, is given by
q1(t + 1) = q1(t)+ αq1(t)(a− 2(b+ c1)q1 − b(q2 + q3))
q2(t + 1) = (1− ν)q2(t)+ ν2(b+ c2) (a− b(q1 + q3))
q3(t + 1) = 12(b+ c3) (a− b(q1 + q2)).
(9)
Therefore, the system (9) describes the dynamical triopoly game with fully heterogeneous players (three different players).
In the next section, we study the dynamical behaviors of this model.
3. Equilibrium points and their stability
In order to study the qualitative behavior of the solutions of the nonlinear discrete dynamical system (9), we define the
equilibrium points of the dynamic triopoly game as a nonnegative fixed point of the dynamical system (9), i.e. the solution
of nonlinear algebraic system
q1(a− 2(b+ c1)q1 − b(q2 + q3)) = 0
(a− 2(b+ c2)q2 − b(q1 + q3)) = 0
(a− 2(b+ c3)q3 − b(q1 + q2)) = 0
(10)
which is obtained by setting qi(t + 1) = qi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 in (9). The algebraic system (10) has two equilibrium points:
E1 =
(
0,
a(b+ 2c3)
3b2 + 4b(c2 + c3)+ 4c2c3 ,
a(b+ 2c2)
3b2 + 4b(c2 + c3)+ 4c2c3
)
(11)
and
E∗ = (q∗1, q∗2, q∗3),
where
q∗1 =
a(b2 + 2b(c2 + c3)+ 4c2c3)
2(2b3 + 3b2(c1 + c2 + c3)+ 4b(c1c2 + c2c3 + c1c3)+ 4c1c2c3)
q∗2 =
a(b2 + 2b(c1 + c3)+ 4c1c3)
2(2b3 + 3b2(c1 + c2 + c3)+ 4b(c1c2 + c2c3 + c1c3)+ 4c1c2c3)
q∗3 =
a(b2 + 2b(c1 + c2)+ 4c1c2)
2(2b3 + 3b2(c1 + c2 + c3)+ 4b(c1c2 + c2c3 + c1c3)+ 4c1c2c3)
(12)
where E1 is the boundary equilibrium point and E∗ is the Nash equilibrium point.
To investigate the local stability of the equilibrium points E1 and E∗ we have to find the Jacobian matrix for the system
of Eq. (9) at any point (q1, q2, q3) takes the following form
J(q1, q2, q3) =

1+ α(a− 4(b+ c1)q1 − b(q2 + q3)) −αbq1 −αbq1
− νb
2(b+ c2) 1− ν −
νb
2(b+ c2)
− b
2(b+ c3) −
b
2(b+ c3) 0
 . (13)
The stability of equilibrium points will be determined by the nature of the equilibrium eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
evaluated at the corresponding equilibrium points.
Proposition 1. The boundary equilibrium point E1 of the discrete dynamical system (9) is a saddle point.
Proof. At the boundary equilibrium point E1 the Jacobian matrix take the form
J(E1) =

1+ αa(b+ 2c2)(b+ 2c3)
3b2 + 4b(c2 + c3)+ 4c2c3 0 0
− νb
2(b+ c2) 1− ν −
νb
2(b+ c2)
− b
2(b+ c3) −
b
2(b+ c3) 0
 ,
The matrix J(E1) has eigenvalues λ1 = 1+ αa(b+2c2)(b+2c3)3b2+4b(c2+c3)+4c2c3 and λ2,3 =
1
2 − 12ν ± 12
√(
1− 2ν + ν2 + νb2
(b+c2)(b+c3)
)
. From
the conditions that a, b, ci (i = 1, 2, 3) are positive parameters and ν ∈ [0, 1], we have that |λ1| > 1 and
∣∣λ2,3∣∣ < 1. Then
E1 is a saddle point of discrete dynamical system (9). 
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Fig. 1. Bifurcation diagram for ν = 1.
3.1. Local stability of Nash equilibrium point
Nowwe consider the stability properties of E∗. Linearizing the system about the Nash equilibrium point E∗, the Jacobian
matrix at E∗ takes the form
J(E∗) =

1− 2α(b+ c1)q∗1 −αbq∗1 −αbq∗1
− νb
2(b+ c2) 1− ν −
νb
2(b+ c2)
− b
2(b+ c3) −
b
2(b+ c3) 0
 ,
so that the necessary and sufficient conditions for E∗ to be asymptotically stable are all the roots of the characteristic equation
λ3 + A1λ2 + A2λ+ A3 = 0 (14)
have magnitudes of eigenvalues less than one. Here A1 = 2αq∗1(b+ c1)− 2+ ν, A2 = −αbq∗1( νb2(b+c2) + b2(b+c3) )− 2αq∗1(c1+
b) + 2αq∗1ν(c1 + b) − ν + 1 − νb
2
4(b+c3)(b+c2)and A3 = νb
2
4(b+c2)(b+c3) (1 − 2αc1q∗1) +
αb2q∗1(1−ν)
2(b+c3) ,where q
∗
1 define in Eq. (12).
Following the Jury criterion [11], the roots of Eq. (14) must satisfy |λ| < 1 for all eigenvalues of corresponding Jacobian
matrix if, and only if,
3+ A1 − A2 − 3A3 > 0
1− A2 + A3(A1 − A3) > 0
1− A1 + A2 − A3 > 0.
(15)
The Nash equilibrium point E∗ is locally asymptotically stable if the Jury conditions (15) are to be satisfied.
4. Numerical simulations
Toprovide somenumerical evidence for the dynamical behaviors of the discrete dynamical system (9),wewill present the
various numerical results, such as bifurcation diagrams, strange attractors, Lyapunov exponents, and sensitive dependence
on initial conditions and fractal dimension.
In order to study the local stability properties of the Nash equilibrium point, it is convenient to consider the following
set of parameters a = 10, b = 1, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.3, c3 = 0.5 and ν = 1. Fig. 1 shows the bifurcation diagram with respect
to α (speed of adjustment of boundedly rational player) of the dynamical game (9). In this figure, the positive values show
that the solutions have chaotic behavior. The bifurcation scenario has occurred if α is small, consequently there is a stable
Nash equilibrium point. One can see that the Nash equilibrium point is locally stable for small values of α. As parameter
α increases, the Nash equilibrium point becomes unstable, and infinitely many period doubling bifurcation of the phase
quantity behavior becomes chaotic. This means that for a large values of speed of adjustment of the boundedly rational
player, the dynamical game (9) always converges to complex dynamics.
Figs. 2–5 show the bifurcation diagrams with respect to the parameter α and for ν = 0.75, 0.5, 0.1 and 0.05. In all these
figures the Nash equilibrium E∗ is locally stable for small values of the parameter α. From these figures one can deduce that,
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Fig. 2. Bifurcation diagram for ν = 0.75.
Fig. 3. Bifurcation diagram for ν = 0.5.
Fig. 4. Bifurcation diagram for ν = 0.1.
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Fig. 5. Bifurcation diagram for ν = 0.05.
Fig. 6. Bifurcation diagram for α = 0.1.
when the value of parameter ν decreases the late period doubling appears. Fig. 6 shows stable Nash equilibrium point for
α = 0.1 and when 0 < ν < 1.
Also Fig. 6 shows that there is no period-doubling bifurcation for α = 0.1, stable Nash equilibrium point for ν in the
range 0 to 1. The bifurcation diagrams of the system (9) with respect to parameter ν when α = 0.25 and α = 0.35 are given
in Figs. 7 and 8.
From Fig. 7 the behavior of the system (9) is changed from stable fixed point to periodic behavior period-two only when
ν = 0.6. Also, period-doubling, period four and period six appears when the parameter α takes the value α = 0.35, as
shown in Fig. 8.
From the above Figures and analysis, one can deduce that if all parameters are kept fixed and only varied the parameter
α, then, the behavior of the system (9) exhibits period-doubling bifurcations and chaos. Also, the behavior of the market is
to be more and more complex, and depends on the parameter α (speed of adjustment of boundedly rational player).
In order to analyze the parameter sets for which aperiodic behavior occurs, one can compute that themaximal Lyapunov
exponent depends on α. For example, if the maximal Lyapunov exponent is positive, one has evidence for chaos. Moreover,
by comparing the standard bifurcation diagram in α, one obtains a better understanding of the particular properties of
the system. In order to study the relationship between the local stability of the Nash equilibrium point and the speed of
adjustment of boundedly rational player α, one can compute the maximal Lyapunov exponents for adjustment factor in
the environment of 1. The maximal Lyapunov exponents which corresponds to Fig.3 is plotted in Fig. 9. This figure displays
the related maximal Lyapunov exponents as a function of α. From Fig. 9, one can easily determine the degree of the local
stability for different values of α ∈ (0, 0.42). From the maximal Lyapunov exponents diagram, it is easy to determine the
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Fig. 7. Bifurcation diagram for α = 0.25.
Fig. 8. Bifurcation diagram for α = 0.35.
parameter-sets for which the system converges to cycles, aperiodic, and chaotic behavior. Beyond that, it’s even possible to
differentiate between cycles of very high order and aperiodic behavior of the system (9) see Fig. 9.
The Fig. 10 represents the graph of a strange attractor of the dynamical game (9) for the parameter values
(a, b, c1, c2, c3, α, ν) = (10, 1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.4, .5) which exhibits fractal structure. Also, when the parameters takes the
values (a, b, c1, c2, c3, α, ν) = (10, 1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.415, .5), the strange attractor of the dynamical game (9) is shown
in Fig. 11.
It is obvious from the numerical simulation that an increase of the speed of adjustment of boundedly rational player α,
holding the other parameters fixed, has a destabilizing effect. But, if all parameters are kept equal and one only varied the
speed of adjustment of adaptive player ν, then the adaptive player has a stabilizing effect for the game. One can conclude
that the existence of the boundedly rational player in the game has a destabilizing effect for the game, but the existence of
the adaptive player has a stabilizing effect on the game.
In fact, an increase of α starting from a set of parameters which ensures the local stability of Nash equilibrium, can
bring the point (α, ν) out the region of stability, through the flip bifurcation curve. In this case, the region of stability
becomes small, and this can cause a loss of stability of E∗. From the above, every one can conclude that the stability of
E∗ depends on the values of the parameter α. The stability region of the Nash equilibrium point for the values of parameters
a = 10, b = 1, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.3, c3 = 0.5 in the plane of adjustment (α, ν) is given in Fig. 12. When the parameter
α increases, complex dynamics such as period doubling and strange attractors are generated where the maximal Lyapunov
exponents of the system (9) become positive see Fig. 9.
The present analyses showed that when all parameters kept fixed and only varied the speed of adjustment of the
boundedly rational player, the structure of the market of the triopoly game becomes very complicated through period
doubling bifurcations. In addition, more complex bounded attractors are created around Nash equilibrium point, which
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Fig. 9. Maximal Lyapunov exponent for ν = 0.5.
Fig. 10. Strange attractor for α = 0.4.
Fig. 11. Strange attractor for α = 0.415.
are aperiodic cycles of high order or chaotic attractors. Also, the dynamics of the triopoly game are so complicated, that
consequently the players are unable to gain a complete understanding of the structure of the market. Hence, complex
dynamics depend on the parameter α which means that existence of boundedly rational player in the market leads to more
rich dynamics than the homogeneous case. So the heterogeneity or diversity of a player’s belief can lead to rich dynamics
and more complexity.
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Fig. 12. The stability region of Nash equilibrium point in the plane (α, ν).
Fig. 13. Shows the sensitive dependence on initial conditions, the two orbits for q1-coordinates at (a, b, c1, c2, c3, α, ν) = (10, 1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.4, 0.5)
with (q1(0), q2(0), q3(0)) = (0.1, 0.3, 0.2) for the solid curve and (q1(0), q2(0), q3(0)) = (0.1001, 0.3, 0.2) for the dashed curve.
4.1. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions
To demonstrate the sensitivity to initial conditions of the system (9), we compute two orbits with initial points
(q1(0), q2(0), q3(0)) and (q1(0)+ 0.0001, q2(0), q3(0)), respectively. The compositional results are shown in Fig. 13. From
this figure, it is clear that, at the beginning, the time series are indistinguishable; but after a number of iterations, the
difference between them builds up rapidly.
In addition, Fig. 13 shows sensitive dependence on initial conditions, q1-coordinates of the two orbits, for system (9),
is plotted against the time with the parameter constellation (a, b, c1, c2, c3, α, ν) = (10, 1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.4, 0.5). The q1-
coordinates of initial conditions differ by 0.0001 and the other coordinates are kept equal.
4.2. Lyapunov exponents and Fractal dimension of the map (9)
The dimension of a strange attractor is a measure of its geometric scaling properties or its complexity, and is often
considered its most basic property. While numerous methods have been proposed for characterizing the fractional
dimension of strange attractors, the most commonmeasure is Lyapunov dimension, proposed by Kaplan and Yorke see [12,
13]. The fractional Lyapunov dimension strange attractors are defined as follows [13]:
dL = j+
i=j∑
i=1
Λi∣∣Λj+1∣∣ ,
whereΛi are Lyapunov exponents (Λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ Λn), j is the largest integer such that∑i=ji=1Λi ≥ 0 and∑i=j+1i=1 Λi < 0. By the
definition of the Lyapunov dimension andwith help of the computer simulation one can show that the Lyapunov dimension
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is of the strange attractor of system (9). At the parameters values (a, b, c1, c2, c3, α, ν) = (10, 1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.4, 0.75),
three Lyapunov exponents exists and areΛ1 ≈ 0.29,Λ2 ≈ 0.24 andΛ3 ≈ −0.81. In our case, the three dimensional map
has the Lyapunov dimension which is given by
dL = 2+ Λ1 +Λ2|Λ3| , Λ1 > Λ2 > Λ3.
Hence the map (9) has a fractal dimension dL ≈ 2 + 0.43|−0.81| = 2. 5309, which is hyperchaotic behavior and has the same
structure of the Hénon like map [14].
5. Chaos control
Pyragas proposed delay feedback control method to control chaos [15]. In Pyragas’ method, control input is based on the
difference between the T -time delayed state and the current state, where T denotes a period of the stabilized orbits. So the
controlled system is
x(t + 1) = f (x(t), u(t))
where u(t) is the input signal and x(t) is the state. Pyragas proposed the following feedback in order to stabilize a T -periodic
orbit
u(t) = k(x(t + 1− T )− x(t + 1)), t > T (16)
where T is the time delay and k is the controlling factor.
In the papers [16,17], it has been presented how the delay feedback control method can applied to control chaos in two
economic models. We apply this technique to control chaotic behavior for the triopoly game with heterogeneous players.
We add the function (16) of DFC in the first equation from the system (9). So the controlled system is given by
q1(t + 1) = q1(t)+ αq1(t)(a− 2(b+ c1)q1 − b(q2 + q3))+ k(q1(t + 1− T )− q1(t + 1))
q2(t + 1) = (1− ν)q2(t)+ ν2(b+ c2) (a− b(q1 + q3))
q3(t + 1) = 12(b+ c3) (a− b(q1 + q2)).
(17)
We know that chaos exists in the system (9) for the parameter values (a, b, c1, c2, c3, α, ν) = (10, 1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.4, .5)
see Fig. 10. By choosing T = 1, hence the controlled system (17) takes the form
q1(t + 1) = q1(t)+ αq1(t)k+ 1 (a− 2(b+ c1)q1 − b(q2 + q3))
q2(t + 1) = (1− ν)q2(t)+ ν2(b+ c2) (a− b(q1 + q3))
q3(t + 1) = 12(b+ c3) (a− b(q1 + q2)).
(18)
The Jacobian matrix of the controlled system (18) is given by
J(q1, q2, q3) =

1+ α
k+ 1 (a− 4(b+ c1)q1 − b(q2 + q3)) −αbq1 −αbq1
− νb
2(b+ c2) 1− ν −
νb
2(b+ c2)
− b
2(b+ c3) −
b
2(b+ c3) 0
 . (19)
Substituting by the Nash equilibrium point into (19) and using the values of parameters which chaos exists in the system
(9). Then the Jacobian matrix (19) has the form
J(q1, q2, q3) =

(−1.478873240+ k)
(k+ 1)
−1.126760563
(k+ 1)
−1.126760563
(k+ 1)
−0.1923076923 0.5 −0.1923076923
−0.3333333333 −0.3333333333 0
 . (20)
By applying Jury conditions (15) on the matrix (20) has eigenvalues with an absolute less than one when k > 0.561. Hence
when k > 0.561, all absolute values of eigenvalues are less than one, whichmeans that the system is stable around the Nash
equilibrium point.
From Fig. 14 one can see that the system is controlled from a chaotic state to a stable state when k > 0.56. Shown in
Fig. 15 is a behavior of the controlled system when k = 1 starts from initial values (q1(0), q2(0), q3(0)) = (0.1, 0.3, 0.2).
This figure shows that a controlled behavior converges to the fixed point.
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Fig. 14. Bifurcation diagram of q1 with respect to the controlling factor k.
Fig. 15. Stabilization of fixed point with k = 0.6.
6. Conclusions
This paper presented the triopoly game, which contains three-types of heterogeneous players: boundedly rational,
adaptive and naive. We have explored the dynamics of this model under different regimes of the main parameters, such
as the players’ speed of adjustment through numerical simulations. When the boundedly rational player accelerates the
adjustment speed of the output quantity, we discovered that it leads to the instability of the system, and makes the system
go to a chaotic region. We have stabilized the chaotic behavior of the model to a stable fixed point by the delay feedback
control method.
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